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A B S T R A C T
While Europe is celebrating the fiftieth anniversary of the
signing of the Rome Treaty, there is much doubt about the
extent of citizens’ emotional attachment to Europe. In this
article we examine whether young Belgians show a sense
of European citizenship, using a range of questions about
the European Union (EU) from a survey administered to
more than 6000 secondary school students. We show that a
genuine identification with Europe – one that is not purely
based on a positive evaluation of the EU from a utilitarian
point of view – is related to higher levels of tolerance
towards ethnic minorities, Muslims and immigrants. In
addition, we will provide an overview of the literature on
European citizenship and its potential connection to a higher
degree of tolerance towards different cultures.
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Introduction
The idea of European citizenship has been at the centre of an intense norma-
tive debate. Questions have been raised about whether or not we should aim
to achieve a common European identity and about who is eligible to take part
in it and who should be excluded. Moreover, intense academic discussion is
taking place regarding the existence of a common fertile ground to develop
a European identity. Others point to an appreciation of these differences as a
possible hallmark of a common European identity (Habermas and Derrida,
2003). Already in the Maastricht Treaty of 1992, the European Union (EU)
defined and pledged to promote the feeling of European citizenship
(Jamieson, 2002). However, when the Union tried to compose a fully fledged
European Constitution in 2005, it did not succeed in convincing its members;
in fact, voters in France and the Netherlands disagreed with the definition of
Europe that was proposed to them or even with the idea of Europe altogether.
In this article, we want to build on the existing research by testing the
relationship between European identification and tolerance towards ethnic
minorities and immigrants among a large and representative sample of 
16-year-old Belgian secondary school students.
So far, little is known about the relation between European citizenship
and tolerance because the debate has been conducted largely on theoretical
and ideological grounds. Authors such as Soysal (1994) and Benhabib (2004),
for example, argue that, from a normative point of view, the development of
a European identity is an important step forward. Citizens transcend the
boundaries of their nation-state and develop a more encompassing sense of
solidarity with broader groups (see also Habermas, 1999). As such, the notion
of European citizenship might even be considered as a first step toward the
development of a truly global sense of ‘post-national’ membership or
belonging (Soysal, 1994). Other authors, however, are much more sceptical.
Following the ‘clash of civilizations’ thesis, they assume that a strong
European identity will inevitably lead to a more antagonistic attitude towards
non-Europeans, especially if they originate from Islamic or Mediterranean
countries (Huntington, 1996). Moreover, some authors claim that the explicit
limitation of European citizenship in the Maastricht Treaty to country
nationals while excluding inhabitants who are non-EU nationals is a warning
signal and shows that the EU does not consider these inhabitants to be
European citizens (Welsh, 1993; Closa, 1998).
The few available empirical studies on this subject seem to point to a
positive relation between tolerance and European identification (Dell’Olio,
2005; Weldon, 2006). In this article, we want to examine this relationship in
depth using a sample of over 6000 secondary school students in Belgium
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surveyed in 2006. Belgium is an interesting country in which to examine the
prevalence of a sense of European citizenship, because it was one of the
Union’s founding members half a century ago and currently hosts the largest
number of European institutions. Thus, Belgians could be expected to have
special ties to Europe. On the other hand, Belgium actually proved to be the
least tolerant of the EU countries before the recent enlargement (Weldon,
2006), so studying (in)tolerance amongst its youngsters might yield interest-
ing clues to the origin of these attitudes.
In this article we will first review the theories concerning European
citizenship and tolerance, before looking at young people’s opinions and
feelings towards Europe and whether they show a sense of being ‘European
citizens’. Then we will examine whether young Belgians are tolerant towards
immigrants and ethnic minorities. Finally, we will bring these two elements
together to examine whether there is a correlation between feelings of toler-
ance and a sense of European citizenship and how differences in tolerance
can be explained. If European identity can be seen as a step towards the
development of a wider sense of solidarity, we should expect a positive
relationship between European citizenship and ethnic tolerance towards
outsider groups. If this is not the case, we assume this relationship is either
non-existent or even negative.
The normative and theoretical study of European
citizenship
When the European Economic Community was founded in 1957, the Treaty
of Rome mentioned ‘the peoples of Europe’. This suggests that developing a
supranational idea of citizenship was not an official objective at that point
(Welsh, 1993). It was only with the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992, when
‘Economic’ was dropped from the title of the organization and the
Community was transformed into a Union, that the EU institutionalized legal
grounds for European citizenship (Painter, 1998). This means that, for the first
time, there was provision for a formal Euro-citizenship, to some extent
approaching the concept of citizenship as defined by Marshall in his classic
seminar in 1946: ‘a status bestowed on those who are full members of a
community. All who possess the status are equal with respect to the rights
and duties with which the status is endowed’ (see Marshall, 1964: 84). This
legal Euro-citizenship is highly formalistic and there is a clear absence of a
participatory or affective dimension, which a ‘thick’ concept of citizenship
would need (Painter, 1998; Delanty, 2000). In a further step towards develop-
ing a sense of European identity, the European Union tried to codify shared
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values and cultural norms in a European Constitution in 2005. Although the
European Union has recently become an important regulator of people’s lives,
people still tend to distance themselves from it and refuse to identify with it
fully (Hooghe and Marks, 2006).
Some 15 years after Maastricht, most so-called formal citizenship rights
in the European Union are still limited to the few rules laid down in the
Maastricht Treaty.1 Although the European Court of Justice has broadened
the concept of European citizenship, for example by entitling a European
citizen’s family members who do not have EU citizenship themselves to some
of the rights laid down in EU law, we see, for example, that many of the old
member states, including Belgium, have made provisions that limit the
freedom of movement and employment for citizens of the new EU countries
until 2009, and in some cases until 2011. So, recent developments risk increas-
ing the gap between EU citizens and third-country nationals by creating
multiple boundaries, instead of helping to bridge them (Oger, 2007).
As in any other form of citizenship, however, one must also distinguish
between the empirical and normative aspects of European citizenship
(Kymlicka and Norman, 1994; Closa, 1998) Although, from a legal point of
view, citizenship of the Union has hardly progressed in more than a decade,
in the meantime there has been an intense debate among theorists in the fields
of law, philosophy and social sciences about the possibility of a ‘European
citizenship’ and the creation of a European identity. A European identity will
in any case be combined with national identities: one can be simultaneously
Flemish, Belgian and European, but not solely European (Brubaker, 1989;
Painter, 1998). Painter (1998) and Delanty (2000) both describe the concept of
multi-level or multi-identification membership: people are simultaneously a
member of the European Union and a member of their national state (and of
lower governance levels). We can see this for example in the 2004 Euro-
barometer, where only 2% of the Dutch referred to themselves as ‘only
European’ and nearly 7% said that being European took precedence over
being Dutch. On the other hand, 58% said that they were Dutch first and
European second (Wennekers, 2005). Carrington and Short (1995) show that
even children as young as eight years old with a mixed background easily
identify with plural ‘national’ identities. Arnett (2002) argues that, owing to
globalization, people develop a bicultural identity: in addition to their local
identity, young people also adopt a more global identity. However, he adds
that this multi-level identity does not always have only positive implications,
because it can create a great deal of confusion, which can lead to the individ-
ual denying one of his or her identities. In our more political conception of
identity, this might mean that young people show a lack of interest in the
higher-level identity, namely the European Union. Isin (2002) stresses a
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similar point by saying that post-modernity has allowed groups that were
previously excluded and marginalized, such as migrants in Europe, to gain
recognition, but that this phenomenon has conversely put further pressure
on the limits of citizenship and might eventually cause animosity between
certain groups. In effect, we should not immediately equate globalization and
post-modernity with tolerance.
For many authors, the problem with European citizenship is that it lacks
many of the qualities that tie people to the nation-state. Delanty (2000: 114)
for example states that Europe lacks ‘core components of a national culture:
language, a shared history, religion, an educational system and press or
media’. Many authors are looking for the European equivalent of the equation
that came into existence in the 19th century and is now almost seen as a
dogma: ‘state = nation = people’ (Hobsbawm, 1997: 23). The search for a
specific characteristic of Europe could prove fruitless, because, as Closa (1998)
states, the Union lacks almost all sociopolitical traits that are usually associ-
ated with nationality and a communitarian understanding of citizenship.
Dell’Olio (2005) claims that, when using common denominators to determine
national identity, Europeans differ as much among themselves as they do
from non-Europeans. This is, in the view of Hainsworth (2006), Fuss (2003)
and many others, a main cause of both the democratic deficit and Europeans’
scepticism towards the integration project. According to Delanty (2000: 112),
‘the more expansive citizenship becomes, the more formalized it is and the
less substantive it can be’. This is why for many authors, instead of focusing
on what we do not have in common, it is diversity in itself that is the best
starting point for a European citizenship (Kostakopoulou, 1998; Habermas,
2002; Habermas and Derrida 2003; Delanty, 2005). Dahrendorf (1994) actually
argues that citizenship adds an extra dimension to political life only in a
heterogeneous state, because there would hardly be any difference between
citizenship and membership of a ‘tribe’ if it worked only in a culturally hom-
ogeneous environment. This leads him to say that ‘the true test of citizenship
is heterogeneity’ (Dahrendorf, 1994: 17). Dahrendorf’s view would lead us to
see European citizenship as similar to Walzer’s definition of what it is to be
an ‘American’: ‘a citizenship that allows for the flourishing of the manyness’
(Walzer, 2004: 633).
From a theoretical point of view, ‘citizenship’ refers to either a formal
status based on rights and duties, or a belonging to a cultural identity or
public participation (Painter 1998; Delanty, 2000; Wallace et al., 2005). Citizen-
ship in a formal sense refers to a state (liberal perspective) or to a nation
(communitarian perspective) (Delanty, 2000). In a globalized world, nation-
states as institutions of governance are eroding (Painter, 1998). Tambini states
that through post-national citizenship ‘nationalism itself will not disappear,
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but the model of national citizenship will be transformed’ (2001: 212). If we
look at the available European data concerning young people, Europe is
considered a space of opportunities rather than a focal point of identification;
this viewpoint implies that it enables people to go where they want to go and
offers them economic gains as well as diversified job opportunities. Young
people therefore largely perceive European citizenship as the right to study,
work or move permanently to any other country in the European Union
(Eurobarometer, 1997; 2001). It is important to distinguish between this 
vision of Europe as a useful ‘instrument’ and true identification with Europe.
Dell’Olio (2005) shows that respondents who say that they feel positive
towards EU institutions can nevertheless identify themselves as ‘only Italian’
and not as ‘also European’.
This article will define European citizenship as the feeling of ‘belonging’
to Europe and the European institutions. This scale will not measure an
‘instrumental’ attachment to the EU institutions; it will use items that capture
identification with Europe. The frequently found negative view of European
citizenship might cast doubt on the validity of the concept. Do European
citizens really have a European identity or should this be seen as a purely
legal and/or theoretical concept without any wider resonance? And, if there
is indeed such an identity, we might ask ourselves if it results in more toler-
ance among individuals. Tolerance will be an indispensable prerequisite if we
want a European citizenship that is not equivalent with the idea of a mental
‘fortress Europe’ but rather an expression of diversity. These issues all point
to the importance of researching the connection between the identification
with Europe and tolerance.
Contribution to the concept of tolerance
Tolerance towards other groups is an essential element of democratic culture
(Almond and Verba, 1963; Dahl, 1998) and European citizenship (Delanty,
1995). Gibson puts it in very simple terms: ‘if political tolerance increases, the
likelihood of successful democracy increases’ (2006: 23). According to differ-
ent authors, now that Europe is trying to develop a new encompassing form
of belonging and citizenship, transcending the nation-state, tolerance should
increase and this should create a sense of group trust (Smith, 1992; Soysal,
1994; Painter, 1998). Since the Second World War, three broad theories have
been advanced that give a causal explanation of tolerance: the authoritarian
personality thesis by Adorno et al. (1950), the contact hypothesis by Allport
(1958) and the social identity thesis mainly developed by Tajfel and Turner
(Tajfel, 1982; Reynolds and Turner, 2002). Only the last two theories are
important for our research and will be briefly described here.
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Because much of the initial research on tolerance was driven by social
psychologists, most studies have focused on individual-level variables. The
contact hypothesis developed by Allport (1958) states that, in specific circum-
stances, contact with persons of ‘out-groups’ increases tolerance towards
people of these groups. One of the factors leading to increased tolerance is
the positive evaluation of this contact by institutions – schools or companies
– or by a government (Fritzsche, 2006). This means that the European Union
could stimulate tolerance by defining European citizenship as a concept that
is clearly an appreciation of diversity and thus yields a positive evaluation
of contact with people from diverse groups. Weldon (2006) points to the
possible influence of institutions on tolerance in saying that, even after
controlling for a large number of individual-level variables, there are still
substantial differences between the people of West European nations
concerning tolerance. Similarly to Allport, Mutz (2002) has shown that cross-
cultural exposure to conflicting ideas makes people more tolerant. He expects
that in the larger European Union people will potentially have more contact
with other people and ideas and thus possibly develop an increasingly
positive attitude toward other cultural groups and/or religions. However,
contact can also create tension between different groups, as was apparent in
the debate about the ‘Polish plumber’ during the discussions in France over
the EU Constitution.
Although Allport’s thesis provides a good insight into the mechanisms
of (in)tolerance, many questions remain. Because the positive effects of
contact were restricted to certain conditions, social psychologists tried to
uncover the cognitive underpinnings of these notions. This enquiry led to the
development of the social identity theory, social identity being defined as ‘that
part of the individual’s self-concept which derives from his knowledge of his
membership of a social group (or groups) together with the value and
emotional significance attached to that membership’ (Tajfel, 1982: 24). Further,
this leads to a worldview that categorizes people as belonging to either in-
group(s) or out-group(s). Because people look for positive self-evaluation,
they might emphasize the positive aspects of their in-groups and, albeit not
in all cases, the negative aspects of the out-groups (Reynolds et al., 2000). This
is even said to happen when there is no conflict between the groups (Tajfel,
1982). Experimental research has been able to produce this in-group/
out-group dynamic even in settings where the participants did not know each
other and the difference between the groups was minimized as much as
possible (for example, by dividing them by tossing a coin), thus bolstering
the claim that this is a very powerful dynamic in human relations (Tajfel,
1982). Of course, the degree to which the differences between the groups will
be emphasized by any individual is functionally dependent on many vari-
ables, for example the importance of group identification to the self-concept,
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the salience of the out-group for comparison and the functionality of the
comparative dimension (Reynolds et al., 2000).
The way these factors work in forming social identity has been the subject
of a great deal of research concerning ethnocentrism and racism, sometimes
leading to surprising results. Sniderman et al. (2004) show that, under
experimental survey manipulation of Dutch subjects, negative views towards
immigrant out-groups by the native in-group are more pronounced under a
perceived threat to the national culture than under economic or safety threats.
Because a person’s social identity is not fixed but is made up of his or her
identification with several groups, it can change in differing circumstances.
Researchers wondered if it was possible to rearrange these identities in such
a way as to be more inclusive by stimulating an identity that encapsulates
the former separate group identities; these authors call this a ‘superordinate’
identity (Kramer and Brewer, 1984). Positive results from stimulating a super-
ordinate identification on ethnocentrism have, among others, been found
between Caucasian-American and African-American groups in experimental
research (Gaertner and Dovidio, 2005) and survey experiments (Transue,
2007) and between native Dutch and immigrants in survey experiments
(Sniderman et al., 2004).
From the point of view of social identity theory, the influence of a
European identity can have opposing effects on its young people, depending
on the way it is perceived. If it is an affirmation of a mainly West European,
Christian identity, then it is actually a confirmation of the national in-group
status at a higher level. However, if it is the identification with people from
other countries who do not share their language and faith, then it is a super-
ordinate identity including former out-groups, as intended in the theory
above. De Vreese and Boomgaardens’ research (2005) on European inte-
gration points in the latter direction: people with anti-immigrant feelings are
more unenthusiastic about European integration and vice versa; this has
partly been related to a feeling of ‘cultural threat’ (McLaren, 2002). The
difference with the current research question is that in existing studies the
superordinate identity always includes the former out-group, which is not
necessarily the case with European identity and immigrants who, for the most
part, come from countries outside the EU. This means that we expect the
possible positive influence of a superordinate identification to be ‘contagious’
to subgroups who remain outside this new identity. This kind of survey
research might have less internal validity than the experiments of social
psychologists with their very strict settings, but one has to keep in mind that
one of the biggest problems in social identity theory is that most of its findings
come from very artificial experimental settings that are therefore not always
transposable to a more realistic environment, where different identities (and
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their consequences) might overlap and interact (see Huddy, 2001). This article,
therefore, aims at taking real influences into account.
Following Weldon (2006), it is important to differentiate between ‘ethnic’
social and political tolerance. People are politically tolerant if they are willing
to allow full ‘liberal democratic and political’ rights to all others, for example
the right of third-country nationals to demonstrate (Mondak and Sanders,
2003; Gibson, 2006). This kind of tolerance is often exemplified by the famous
words erroneously ascribed to Voltaire: ‘I disapprove of what you say, but I
will defend to the death your right to say it’ (cited in Finkel et al., 1999: 205).
Social tolerance is more related to the evaluation of direct contact with people
from another group, for example having a boss from a different ethnic group
or allowing one’s child to date somebody from another ethnic group.
Weldon’s (2006) examination of the Eurobarometer data shows that Euro-
peans are much more willing to be politically tolerant towards third-nation
foreigners than to mix socially. Therefore, the items comprising our tolerance
scale relate to social tolerance, as we try to measure a more direct and deeper
tolerance, especially in 16-year-olds for whom the ‘hypothetical’ granting of
political rights might not adequately capture their feelings towards foreign
people.
Apart from the theories mentioned, there are some factors that seem to
influence tolerance in most settings. We will, therefore, include them as
control variables in our analysis. First, many investigations have established
a connection between education and tolerance (Weldon, 2006). Separate
studies have shown that this relation is not just owing to a better understand-
ing of the social desirability of tolerance among the more highly educated
(Wagner and Zick, 1995). Among young people, girls have been found to be
more tolerant than boys (Fritzsche, 2006). We will investigate whether an
increased feeling of European citizenship leads to greater tolerance.
Data, methods and the Belgian context
Belgium offers an ideal setting for the study of citizenship, being a society
with two large language groups that live in different parts of the country.
About 60% of Belgians are Dutch speakers and 40% are French speakers; there
is also a small German-speaking minority, who are not included in our
research. Belgian federalism has developed a system in which the federal
government gives policy-making power to ‘communities’ (mainly for culture,
education, welfare and language policy) and ‘regions’ (responsible for more
economic and employment-related topics), which to a large extent overlap –
Brussels being the exception. Belgium is a society with multiple government
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levels, making it a linguistically divided country (e.g. the two language
groups have a separate labour market and educational system (Billiet 
et al., 2006).
The cultural divide between the language groups in Belgium has already
often been addressed (Billiet et al., 2006). The two regions have different
identities. The Flemish/Dutch-speaking identity ‘appears to be associated
with the protection of the Flemish cultural heritage – in particular the Dutch
language – and hence with a more defensive attitude toward other cultures’
(Billiet et al., 2003: 243). The Walloon/French-speaking identity, on the other
hand, is more ‘associated with the socio-economic emancipation of the
Walloon region and also with openness toward other cultures and anti-racism’
(Billiet et al., 2003: 243). This leads us to the expectation that Dutch-speaking
respondents are less tolerant, even if other research indicates that there is no
significant difference between the Dutch- and the French-speaking parts with
regard to the acceptance of immigrants (De Witte, 1999).
The relationship between European citizenship and tolerance will be
tested using the results of the Belgian Youth Survey 2006 (BYS 2006), which
was conducted among 6330 16-year-olds in Belgium. The respondents were
sampled in the two major language groups, French and Dutch. Dutch respon-
dents were sampled in the region of Flanders and in the bilingual region of
the capital, Brussels (n = 3453). French-speaking respondents were sampled
in the region of Wallonia and again in Brussels (n = 2877). To avoid
confusion, we will refer to Flemish respondents and Dutch-speaking respon-
dents from Brussels as ‘Dutch-speaking’ youngsters and to Walloon and
Brussels francophone respondents as ‘French-speaking’ youngsters. The
survey contained various questions on notions of citizenship, ethnocentrism,
tolerance and other related political attitudes. The data were collected through
written surveys in schools. Several researchers visited 112 schools in order to
conduct the survey. The schools were selected by place of residence and
school system and controlled for the offered tracks (general, technical and
vocational) and number of pupils (Hooghe et al., 2006).
In our analysis we control for language groups because, in line with
previous research, we expect significant differences. We also take the effect of
the socioeconomic background of the family into account, because the more
highly educated tend to be more positive towards foreigners (Billiet et al., 1990;
Pettigrew et al., 1998; De Witte, 1999). We asked the respondents to state their
educational goals in life. This serves as a good indicator of their educational
situation; non-reported findings also suggest that it is a good proxy for the
educational attainment of the parents and thus the socioeconomic status of 
the subject.2 Further, gender might also be an important control variable.
Because we intended to measure tolerance towards ethnic minorities, Muslims
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and immigrants, we decided to exclude from the analysis all respondents 
who were not born in Belgium or whose parents were not born in Belgium 
(n = 1887) to avoid making a Type II error (i.e. saying that there is no relation-
ship when there actually is one).
Main hypothesis and results
In this paper we want to explore the relationship between identification with
Europe and tolerance, for example towards ethnic minorities, Muslims or
other groups. More specifically, we want to address the question of whether
European citizenship promotes or inhibits positive feelings towards outsider
groups. Diversity is one of the main characteristics of a new, modern Europe
in a globalizing world. We expect that people who identify themselves as
‘European citizens’ are more tolerant than those predominantly attached to
the national or regional level.
Research has shown that the nation-state is the easiest level for people to
identify with. One of the key advantages of nation-states is the presence of
symbols that allow citizens to express their feelings of belonging (Brubaker
and Cooper, 2000). The adherence to the nation-state can vary; Carey (2002)
shows that people who display stronger feelings of national identity display
lower levels of support for the European Union; even if some of them
acknowledge the practical aspects of the Union, they certainly do not see 
it as an object of identification (Dell’Olio, 2005). A first step, therefore, is to
see which policy level young people prefer: Europe, Belgium or a lower 
policy level?
Looking at the results in Table 1, we find that, after Belgium, the local
level is very important to youngsters. Although Fuss (2003) finds that Europe
constitutes a significant source of political identity for young people, we
cannot find such an attachment. Young Belgians feel most attracted to
Belgium as a nation-state and to the city level (Table 1). We find significant
differences between the language groups, with French-speaking youngsters
showing a higher preference than Dutch speakers for the supranational and
the global levels (European and world citizen).
Despite the fact that young people see themselves as Belgians in the first
place and not as ‘Europeans’, they do not consider the decisions of the
European Union to be of less importance in their daily lives than those of the
Belgian or regional governments (Table 1). Whereas for Dutch-speaking
youngsters the three policy levels receive about the same score, for French
speakers the European Union is the most important policy-level influence. The
fact that limited ‘affective support’ for the EU does not exclude ‘utilitarian
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support’ has already been found in adult samples (Dell’Olio, 2005). These
results should also be put in perspective: as we can see in Table 1, politics are
less important for young people than persons who are relatively close to them,
such as their parents and friends.
Young people do not just believe that the European Union takes import-
ant decisions; they also have a certain degree of trust in the European
Parliament, more than in the Belgian or regional parliament (Table 1). The
Dutch-speaking youngsters tend to have more trust in parliaments in general,
but the differences between the language groups are not significant.
In interpreting these results, the respondents’ actual knowledge about the
European Union must be taken into account. At the time of the survey, only
16% of the respondents knew for example that José Manuel Barosso was the
President of the European Commission; 23% knew who the Belgian Minister
of Justice was and 42% to which party Prime Minister Guy Verhofstadt
belonged. According to Wallace et al. (2005), emotional attachment to Europe
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Table 1
Dutch- French- Mean Significance
speaking speaking difference t-value
a. ‘In the first place I think of myself as . . .’ (range: 0–5)
a citizen of my town 3.74 (1.26) 3.52 (1.48) 0.229 5.218***
a citizen of my province 3.37 (1.28) 3.04 (1.38) 0.339 7.968***
Flemish/Walloon/Bruxellois 3.50 (1.41) 3.06 (1.51) 0.438 9.368***
Belgian 4.05 (1.18) 4.17 (1.20) –0.112 –3.006**
European 3.04 (1.40) 3.41 (1.44) –0.370 –8.255***
World-citizen 2.48 (1.63) 3.09 (1.78) –0.606 –11.305***
b. ‘How important are the decisions of . . . in your daily life?’ (range 0–10)
Parents 7.87 (1.90) 7.80 (2.00) 0.065 1.058 (n.s.)
Friends 7.83 (1.79) 7.39 (2.04) 0.440 7.210***
Teachers 5.27 (2.34) 5.55 (2.42) –0.279 –3.742***
European Union 3.79 (2.67) 3.57 (2.79) 0.228 2.621**
Belgian government 3.75 (2.58) 3.39 (2.67) 0.358 4.311***
Regional government 3.80 (2.57) 3.30 (2.59) 0.493 6.041***
c. ‘How much trust do you have in the following institutions?’ (range: 0–10)
European Parliament 5.42 (2.50) 5.32 (2.52) 0.099 1.246 (n.s.)
Regional parliament 5.04 (2.43) 4.96 (2.52) 0.074 0.935 (n.s.)
Belgian parliament 4.80 (2.36) 4.68 (2.38) 0.113 1.497 (n.s.)
Data: BYS 2006; N = 4,443.
Entries are mean scores; standard deviation between brackets.
Significance: p < 0.001 = ***; p < 0.01 = **; p < 0.05 = *
indicates a certain interest in European developments. Hence, considering the
fact that the young people in the sample have a rather low sense of belong-
ing to the European Union as well as a low level of European knowledge, we
might expect them to show little interest in Europe.3
A number of questions were asked with the aim of measuring the atti-
tudes of young people towards the (dis)advantages of the European Union.
As we can see in Table 2, for young people Europe means a better future,
more job opportunities and the opportunity to travel around freely, as well
as a guarantee for peace. Whereas many adults consider the European Union
to be a bureaucratic institution, this is not the case for the young people in
this sample. Nor do they perceive the European Union as a destroyer of
national cultural identity. However, the European Union only half-heartedly
succeeds in the creation of a European identity, because young Belgians do
not feel that the EU makes them into European citizens. However, there is a
difference of 14 percentage points between Dutch-speaking (majority
disagreeing) and French-speaking (majority agreeing) respondents to this
item. In Table 2 we see that the more utilitarian aspects, such as travelling
and jobs, prevail over the affective or identity aspect of Europe.
We find different feelings towards Europe and the European Union 
that might conflate to something approximating ‘European citizenship’.
Especially among the French-speaking youngsters, we find a reasonable indi-
cation of a belonging to Europe in Tables 1 and 2. These young people
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Table 2 Attitudes towards the European Union (EU): percentages that ‘strongly
agree’ and ‘somewhat agree’
Dutch- French-
speaking speaking
The EU offers me the opportunity to travel freely 
on the European continent 78.8 83.7
The EU creates a better future and more job 
opportunities for young people 56.9 58.7
The EU is a guarantee for peace in Europe 56.2 67.1
Through the EU I feel a full citizen of Europe 43.1 57.3
The EU represents a lot of bureaucracy and a waste 
of money and energy 32.1 46.5
The EU destroys the cultural identity of each country 25.8 38.7
Number of cases 2,695 1,503
Data: BYS 2006; N = 4,443. Entries are frequencies.
Range of all questions (1–4), from strongly agreeing, somewhat agreeing, somewhat disagreeing
and strongly disagreeing.
certainly appreciate a number of benefits in the European Union and do not
especially adhere to scepticism about a Brussels-based bureaucratic monster
demolishing national cultures, an image often portrayed during the debate
about the EU Constitution. Contrary to the findings of Wallace et al. (2005),
the European Union does not carry the lowest priority for young people: it
even outperforms Belgian and community institutions in terms of trust and
importance. Young people do not feel close to one specific policy level; they
feel a little close to all of them.
Out of the questions presented above, we created a ‘European citizen-
ship’ scale expressing a feeling of really belonging to the European Union.
This scale is composed of four items: trust in the European Parliament, the
importance attributed to the European Union, the feeling of being a European
citizen through the European Union and the feeling of being in the first place
European. These are items that capture a sense of belonging to or identifi-
cation with Europe, which is important for the subsequent use of this scale,
because the relationship predicted by authors between tolerance and
European citizenship concerns the benefits of supranational identification; it
has less to do with a utilitarian vision on travel inside Europe, even if the
latter has more adherents in the survey (see the Appendix at the end of this
article). The rather moderate Cronbach’s alpha (0.56) shows that it is a scale
with a low internal consistency, but if we know the theoretical validity of the
items we can nevertheless use it (Schmitt, 1996). The fact that our sample
consists of young people from all educational levels and the scale is made up
of items derived from different question batteries probably further explains
the modest performance of this scale (Alwin and Krosnick, 1991; Jennings,
2007).4 Furthermore, because these are the best items we have at our disposal
to measure European citizenship – a concept that in general lacks good
empirical measures – we also have to rely on face validity to measure it
(Jenson, 2007).
In the second phase of the analysis we will look at the attitudes of young
Belgians towards different ethnic groups. First, we offered the subjects a list
of statements concerning immigrants or the need for cultural homogeneity.
In Table 3 we see that, on almost every item, half of the population shows
support for the negative statement towards immigrants. They have difficulties
accepting the immigrants’ customs, the presence of the immigrants in terms
of job security, and so on. Almost four out of ten in the Dutch-speaking group
indicate that they do not trust people from other ethnic groups. These rather
intolerant attitudes are not a new finding: Eurobarometer surveys (1997, 2001
and 2006, for the general population; Billiet et al., 2006) have already shown
that young Belgians are fairly intolerant compared with other European
countries. In general, we see that the French-speaking youngsters are more
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tolerant. The only tolerance item where French speakers are less tolerant than
Dutch speakers is the job security item; this may be related to the fact that
the economic situation is precarious in large parts of the French-speaking
region.
Besides general statements about immigrants, tolerance towards specific
groups was also measured (Table 4). We asked how close young
Dutch/French speakers felt to French/Dutch speakers, Muslims, immigrants,
Africans and Caucasian people. Young Belgians feel most closely connected
to Caucasians (mean = 7.88; std.dev. = 2.33). As regards the feeling of close-
ness towards the other language group, we see that even the positive feeling
towards ‘Caucasians’ is limited to one’s own language group, lending support
to the notion that intolerance constitutes a general personality trait. Young
people feel least connected to immigrants, Muslims and African people. For
all the items, we find significant differences between the language groups,
with the French-speaking youngsters being significantly more tolerant
towards the other groups, although they also stay below the mean score for
all these tolerance items. Only the feeling of closeness towards ‘Caucasians’
is not significantly different on the two sides of the language barrier.
The respondents were also asked if they could see themselves dating
somebody from another cultural or ethnic group one day. In this way, we
tried to evoke a real situation and capture the feelings involved. We found a
similar pattern, in that once again the respondents trust Caucasian people:
Quintelier and Dejaeghere Does European Citizenship Increase Tolerance in Young People? 3 5 3
Table 3 Attitudes towards immigrants: percentages that ‘agree’ or ‘completely
agree’ on the following statements
Dutch- French-
speaking speaking
It is better for a country if almost everyone shares 
the same customs and traditions 46.6 37.6
If a country wants to reduce tensions, it should stop 
immigration 51.6 48.1
The presence of too many immigrants is a threat 
to our way of life 59.7 56.0
The arrival of new immigrants will make it harder 
for me to get a decent job later on 59.1 63.9
I do not trust people of other ethnic groups 38.5 21.1
Number of cases 2,792 1,650
Data: BYS 2006; N = 4,443.
Range of all questions (1–4), from strongly agreeing, somewhat agreeing, somewhat disagreeing
and strongly disagreeing.
80% think it is possible that they might ever date a Caucasian girl/boy. By
contrast, the subjects are quite sure that they will never date an immigrant or
a Muslim (70%) and are also fairly sure that they will never date an African.
When it comes to a real situation, we again find significant differences for
every item at the p < .001 level, except in the case of ‘Caucasians’. Addition-
ally, the French-speaking youngsters are more open than the Dutch speakers
to the other groups.
We have created a scale for tolerance using the replies to the above ques-
tions on tolerance. It is composed of the battery of questions concerning
‘dating’ and ‘feeling close’, though including only the attitude questions
towards Muslims, immigrants and African people. This is a strong and
reliable scale, suitable to be the dependent variable in a regression analysis
(see the Appendix).
In a final analysis we will now bring the different elements of our
examination together to see whether people who consider themselves real
European citizens are more tolerant towards different groups of people and
if they have a more tolerant attitude in general. We use an ordinary least
squares regression (OLS), with the tolerance scale as the dependent variable
(see the Appendix). We opted for the most parsimonious model that is related
to the theory instead of adding as many variables as possible in the re-
gression to inflate the explained variance. The analysis consists of two steps:
the first model (Model 1) does not control for contact with people of 
different ethnic groups; in a second model we add this variable to see whether
the influence of European citizenship still holds when controlling for Allport’s
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Table 4 Mean scores for the sense of closeness to members of other groups
Dutch- French- Significance 
speaking speaking t-value
French-speaking people 3.10 (2.82) n.a.
–5.101***
Dutch-speaking people n.a. 3.59 (2.93)
Muslims 2.02 (2.44) 3.11 (2.71) –12.598***
Immigrants 2.06 (2.40) 3.00 (2.71) –10.922***
African people 2.81 (2.74) 4.08 (2.91) –13.489***
Caucasian people 7.91 (2.73) 7.83 (2.25) 1.103 (n.s.)
Number of cases 2,650 1,415
Data: BYS 2006; N = 4,443.
Entries are mean scores and standard deviation between brackets.
Significance: p < 0.001 = ***; p < 0.01 = **; p < 0.05 = *
Question: How close do you feel to the following groups? (range: 0–10)
hypothesis (1958). In the first model we can see that the standard control vari-
ables of ‘Gender’ and ‘Education’ are completely in line with our theoretical
expectations. Girls are more tolerant than boys, and having higher
educational aspirations also has a benign effect on attitudes towards other
ethnic groups. The strongest parameter among the variables is the linguistic
region in which the young people live. Our results show that the regions are
already very clearly delimited on this topic at the age of 16. This supports
Weldon’s claim that ‘there is a strong relationship between citizen tolerance
for ethnic minorities and the degree to which the dominant ethnic tradition
is institutionalized in laws, rules, norms of a nation-state’ (Weldon, 2006: 332).
Finally, as we predicted from theory, we find that European citizenship
has an effect on tolerance, even after the effects of gender, language group
and education are taken into account. This impact is in the same range as that
of gender and educational goal. Our theoretical section referred to research
showing that tolerance is (in certain circumstances) influenced by the amount
of contact people have with members of out-groups. To test this claim, we
add a contact variable to see if our results from Model 1 still hold. If we look
at the change in explained variance between the models, we see that the
contact variable has considerable explanatory power and that it also becomes
the largest parameter in our model. Nevertheless, it is clear from the table
that, although there is a small decrease in the parameter for European citizen-
ship in this second model, it still stands independently as an explanatory
variable for tolerance among the young respondents.
These findings contradict other research that found a relationship
between European identification and intolerance towards immigrants. This
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Table 5 Mean scores for dating members of other groups (0–5)
Dutch- French- Significance 
speaking speaking t-value
French speaking people 2.40 (1.03) n.a.
13.068***
Dutch speaking people n.a. 2.85 (1.07)
Muslims 1.76 (0.85) 2.39 (1.08) –18.870***
Immigrants 1.88 (0.91) 2.44 (1.06) –16.972***
African people 2.03 (0.96) 2.58 (1.10) –15.456***
Caucasian people 4.45 (0.77) 4.40 (0.83) 1.592 (n.s.)
Number of cases 2,635 1,394
Data: BYS 2006; N = 4,443.
Entries are mean scores; standard deviation between brackets.
Significance: p < 0.001 = ***; p < 0.01 = **; p < 0.05 = *
Question: Would you consider dating someone from the following groups? (range: 1–5)
research relied on a very small sample and was – unlike this study – not repre-
sentative of the Belgian population, as the authors themselves indicate (Licata
and Klein, 2002). Our results show that tolerance is a multifaceted phenom-
enon, and that there are several variables forming tolerant attitudes. This
implies that tolerance is a desirable good in a democracy. Moreover, our
results stress the importance of educating young people in being European,
and thus tolerant, citizens.
Conclusion
This article has tried to add an empirical part to the normative and theor-
etical discussion about the consequences of European citizenship. In the
bivariate analysis our results show that, although Europe is not on a par with
the national Belgian level as a focal point of identification, its score is very
similar to that of the lower policy levels. When we ask young people about
the importance of decisions at different policy levels, the European Union
equals (among Dutch speakers) or surpasses (among French speakers) the
different Belgian levels. The European Parliament is also the assembly that
instils the most confidence in Belgian youth. This shows that, although
Europe may not be their first priority, they do not dismiss its value in policy
terms. Concerning tolerance, Belgian youth sadly live up to the expectation
gained from previous research on adults (Weldon, 2006): half of them see
immigration as a source of tension; four out of ten think everybody should
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Table 6 Determinants of Tolerance
Model 1 Model 2
Gender (0: boy) 0.124*** 0.109***
Educational goal 0.144*** 0.141***
Language
(0: Dutch-speaking region) 0.271*** 0.213***
European citizenship 0.120*** 0.112***
Contact with diverse people 0.282***
Explained variance 0.146 0.221
Number of cases 3,542 3,512
Data: BYS 2006. N = 4,443. Entries are standardized coefficients from OLS-Regression.
Significance: p < 0.001 = ***; p < 0.01 = **; p < 0.05 = *
Contact with diverse people is a 0–10 scale which measures the ethnic, linguistic and religious
diversity of the young peoples’ network of friends.
share the same customs and traditions; and one-third state that they do not
trust people who are not from their ethnic group. In addition, many respon-
dents cannot imagine dating someone from another ethnic group one day.
There is, nevertheless, a marked difference between the language groups,
with Dutch speakers being more ethnocentric than French speakers.
Bringing both elements together, we were able to demonstrate that adher-
ence to a European identity leads to more tolerance, just as some proponents
of supranational or superordinate identity have predicted. Young Belgians
who see themselves as being European citizens are more tolerant towards
ethnic minorities and immigrants, controlling for level of education, origin
and gender. This means that identification with Europe can be viewed as a
positive choice accompanied by tolerance and openness. The results of the
analysis, therefore, do not support fears concerning the rise of a ‘fortress
Europe’, possibly with a corresponding antagonistic European identity.
Rather, all our findings support Soysal’s (1994) argument that Europe is the
first step towards post-national citizenship and solidarity.
Carrington and Short (1995) found in their research that eight-year-old
children hardly make any reference to ‘race’ when asked what it means to be
‘British’; it is only at a later stage that this terminology appears in their
language (see also Nesdale, 2002). This means that there is no innate sense of
an ‘ethnic’ definition of a community. If young people could learn to feel a
sense of connection to a European community that already defines itself as a
‘unity in diversity’, this might greatly diminish ethnic intolerance in Europe.
This is definitely an interesting challenge for a Union that has been doing
much soul-searching following the failure of the European Constitution.
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Appendix
‘European Citizenship’-scale (0–10)
Extraction Component
How much trust do you have in the European Parliament? 0.538 0.733
How far-reaching or important are the decisions of the 
European Union for your daily life? 0.512 0.716
I consider myself in the first place a European citizen. 0.396 0.629
Thanks to the European Union I feel myself a full citizen 
of Europe. 0.382 0.618
Data: BYS 2006; N = 4,443. All variables were recoded 0–10. Cronbach’s Alpha = 0.563 (4 items);
45.7% of the variance explained; scale 0–10. Principal Components Analysis.
Notes
1 It states that every person holding the nationality of a member state shall be
a citizen of the Union and that citizens of the Union shall enjoy the rights
conferred by the Treaty and shall be subject to the duties imposed by it. Those
rights as an EU citizen are the right to move and reside freely within the terri-
tory of the member states; the right to vote and to stand as a candidate at
municipal elections in the member state in which one resides; the right to be
entitled to protection by the diplomatic or consular authorities of any member
state; and the right to petition the European Parliament (Hottinger, 1997).
2 The correlation coefficient between educational goal and a composite index
of the educational attainment of the parents in our survey is .380 (as a
comparison, two similar trust items asked contiguously have a correlation
coefficient of .450 in our sample). The parents’ educational attainment
question produced significantly more missing data because students used the
‘other diploma’ category more than expected, and very often their descrip-
tion was too unclear to fit into the strict coding scheme.
3 However, growing knowledge about the European Union increases trust, and
vice versa (Eurobarometer, 2006).
4 We also tested whether the scale yielded similar results to those gained from
other items (for example, ‘Thanks to the European Union I feel myself a full
citizen of Europe’), and this is indeed the case. As far as we know, this is also
one of the first attempts to construct a scale of European identity.
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